Method to his madness?

Chripa on Atlas Shrugged makes an interesting point about our effort in Iraq.

In my opinion, our worst enemies are both Saudi-Arabia and Iran.
Saudi-Arabia sponsors radical Islam in the whole world and Saudis carried out the 9/11 attacks. So I believe after 9/11 the US gouvernment figured that they must become independent from Saudi oil. They attacked Iraq, among other reasons, to replace Saudi oil with Iraqi oil. Being no longer addicted to their oil they would have been able to set Saudi Arabia under pressure. With hindsight it is true that Iran is the worst threat, but at the time I think it was not a stupid idea to take on Iraq/Saudi-Arabia first.

For his point to be valid one has to presume a degree of strategic cunning that is belied by President Bush's rhetoric in the run up to the invasion of Iraq, and since. (It is precisely the apparent absence of a talent for conceptual thought or devious calculation that unsettles me about the president. Or, at least, non-transparent devious calculation. The amnesty campaign was most certainly an exercise in transparent deviancy that fooled no one.)

I don't see Iraq as an instance of strategic cunning so much as a mere visceral reaction to 9/11 fueled in some measure by a desire to deal with the Hussein "problem" once and for all. Hussein was a problem for the Iraqis and the Iranians but not really for us as of March 2003.

There was plenty of evidence of Hussein's actively seeking nuclear technology justifying the desire to stop his advancing that agenda of his. Reports of Soviet assistance in removing sensitive items from Iraq prior to the invasion and evidence of creative and determined Iraqi efforts to conceal weapons of war more than explain the failure to find evidence of (nuclear) WMD after the invasion.

Even so, the more advanced Iranian nuclear weapon program would have called for an attack on Iran, if that were the real motivating reason for invading. Was Iraq just an instance of psychological displacement?

Showing up in Iraq – irrespective of justifications elegant or otherwise – also served a useful purpose in that it was enormously educational to the Libyans, Iranians, and other dirt bag nation in the area. It would have continued to inform them had we not signaled our determination to bind ourselves to the doctrines of limited war, the bête noire of our post WWII military adventures.

Long-term prospect of the democratization goal seems destined to fail, however, given the to-the-bone Muslim love of theocracy, dictatorship, jihad, and obscurantism.

Nevertheless, staying on to bleed al Qaida is an excellent reason for staying, especially as a more realistic military approach (the surge) may enable us yet to be "successful," that is, victorious. (Whether this is the most efficient use of our resources is another question, considerations of maintaining credibility aside.)

Okay, but . . . what if Chripa is correct? Suppose there are indeed devious, long-range thinkers in the White House, National Security Council, the Pentagon, and State? Then the utility of our Excellent Iraq Adventure is seen to be much greater: energy independence of Saudi Arabia (though not of Islamic hydrocarbons) and a consequent free hand to deal with the Saudi bastards and their spreading of the Wahhabi filth around the living rooms of decent folk.

I'd love it if Chripa were right. Unfortunately it's a bit too far fetched to think that our foreign policy is determined by Mr. Bush per an Eishenhowerian iron fist concealed in the rhetorical evidence of the speaker's life-long battle with the English language.

Comment by Chripa on "Israel Called It: Iran not Iraq." By Atlas Shrugged, 9/1/07.