Obama Admin. conclusion of Assad chemical attack questionable.

The insurgent Obama Puppet Government (OPG) in Washington, D.C., claims the Assad government in Syria launched a chemical attack on its own civilians, which claim was made in order to rush to war in Syria to topple Pres. Assad.

However, a professor at M.I.T. and a former U.N. weapons inspector cast doubt on the OPG version.^[1]

Basically:

• Distance from Syrian government positions to site of sarin nerve gas release – 6 miles.
• Range of sarin gas rocket – 2 miles.

Conclusion: the gas attack came from "rebel"-controlled or contested areas (i.e., areas contested or controlled by deranged, al Qaida, fanatical nutcases, A/K/A "our allies") within two miles of the points of gas release.

The Obama Occupation Administration analysis relies on two back azimuths from crater analysis of U.N. inspectors intersecting at a likely Syrian artillery position within a government-controlled area, one that was no less than 5 miles from the nearest gas release site.

Also, the Obama Administration claim that impact point of chemical rocket was visible from a reconnaissance satellite is questionable. The payload of a gas rocket is apparently unlike that of a conventional high explosive (HE) round such as a mortar round. A gas canister only needs to be opened enough by a charge to allow the gas to escape and spread. (Could a stronger charge also neutralize the gas?) A charge is not needed to spread the payload mechanically like a phosphorous round. With an HE round, a powerful charge is used to shatter the steel warhead and spread the resulting shrapnel as forcefully and as far as possible. The difference in the amount of explosive charge needed in a shrapnel-spraying warhead and a chemical warhead is substantial. In the former, the blast and shrapnel do indeed disturb the soil at the point of impact substantially. In the latter case, hardly at all I suspect. Satellite detection doubtful.

Whether it makes sense for Assad forces to have set up at no less than six places in contested areas to release gas in areas with non-combatants depends on tactical considerations.

For example, how easy it would be to carry the warheads to those sites in a highly-contested combat zone and how easy would it be to transport six launchers (with a total of 11 warheads) to those six sites and return them safely to friendly areas. The warhead presumably used weighs something like 105 lbs. and the rocket motor, fin assembly and shaft (or tube) would be 82 inches in length, assuming the shaft is inserted all the way into the warhead. If the weight of the rocket motor, etc., is 70 lbs. that's a lot of weight if the device is carried as one piece and two hefty and awkward pieces of equipment to carry about in a combat area, not to mention the warhead's being highly dangerous to any crew members. Crew members would have to be highly trained to deal with such dangerous warheads. I have no idea what the launcher would look like. A simple tray or tube might suffice but the simpler the device the greater the hazard to the crew from misfires or wild rounds.

These considerations apply equally to government and "rebel" forces. Knowing who controlled what areas and what freedom of movement would have been enjoyed by either faction would perhaps clarify which side could more easily have deployed the gas. Certainly, the heavier and more complex the launcher, the more fragile the warhead, the greater the weight of the weapon, the more unwieldy the weapon for man transport, the more unreliable the weapon, the more cumbersome the crew protective clothing, the more distant the base area from the launch points (six miles from the nearest government-controlled area in one case), and the more ferocious the fighting, then the less likely it seems to me that Assad would have employed the gas from a contested area.

To the contrary, if the rockets could have been launched from armored vehicles.

The strategic issues seem to favor Assad. What advantage at all could he have gained from such clumsy and indiscriminate weapon? The "rebels," however, might have considered these rockets precision weapons in view of Obama's ridiculous "red line." Just the thing to energize a clueless – but not guileless – American (putative).

CONCLUSION: To the extent that the OPG analysis concluded the Syrian artillery piece inside government-controlled territory was the source of the gas rockets, anything generated by the OPG is highly suspect and needs to be taken with a grain of salt, especially when served up with a steaming side helping of "Responsibility to Protect," which doctrine^[2] jams the needle way into the barf zone on the political hypocrisy meter.

Notes
^[1] "Weapons Inspectors: Syrian Chemical Weapons Fired from REBEL-HELD Territory." Submitted by George Washington, Zero Hedge, 1/16/14.
^[2] N/A in Benghazi or along U.S.-Mexican border.